Paper · 1981 · intermediate level
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government
Allan H. Meltzer, Scott F. Richard
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 914–927
- Link
- publisher / source page
~5,566 citations
Source: scispace/Semantic Scholar aggregation · verified 2026-07-20. Counts drift daily and differ by database; treat as a dated snapshot.
Contested finding
Empirically the core prediction (rising inequality -> rising demanded/realized redistribution) has not held in the U.S. since the 1970s; see Gilens & Page 2014 for one explanation.
In plain language
A formal model predicting that as inequality rises, the median voter should demand more redistribution — so democracies should self-correct for rising inequality.
Technical summary
Median-voter model of the size of government: redistribution is set by the voter with median income relative to mean income; a widening mean-median gap should increase demanded redistribution.
Key takeaways
- The theoretical prediction that Part 6 (political science) directly falsifies empirically — U.S. inequality rose sharply post-1970s without a matching rise in redistribution.
- Often called the 'Meltzer-Richard paradox' when its prediction fails to hold.
Themes
Related works
- Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens — Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, 2014